China is managing a mismatch between plateauing liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand and its rapidly growing LNG contract portfolio by reselling surplus cargoes abroad. IEEFA estimates that China resold between 17–19 million tonnes (Mt) of LNG in 2025 alone, including 8.4Mt that were carried on vessels chartered by Chinese companies.
IEEFA estimates that Chinese companies earned USD4.6 billion in profit from reselling LNG sourced from the United States (US) and Australia between 2021 and June 2026. The top buyers in 2025 include South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands.
The total volume of China’s LNG contracts is expected to rise to 114Mt in 2028, while downward revisions of LNG growth in the wake of the current Middle East conflict could see China’s LNG surplus grow to more than 47Mt in the early 2030s. Large state-owned buyers are pivoting to shipping and bunkering to absorb this surplus.
With lower LNG demand expected in China, challenges facing demand growth in emerging markets, and an unprecedented buildout of LNG export capacity this decade, Chinese resales of surplus volumes could exacerbate global LNG oversupply in the coming years.
Over the last decade, China has transformed from the world's largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) buyer into a major global reseller. Plateauing domestic demand, a ballooning portfolio of long-term contracts, and a structural pivot by state-owned enterprises into LNG shipping and trading are positioning Chinese companies as significant competitors to traditional suppliers as the market enters a period of historic oversupply.
China's LNG imports have fallen from a peak of 79 million tonnes (Mt) in 2021 to 66Mt in 2025 and are expected to decline further to 63Mt in 2026. Meanwhile, extensive contracting between 2021 and 2023, during which Chinese buyers signed nearly 60Mt of new supply agreements, has generated a growing surplus of contracted volumes. Ship-tracking data show that resales by Chinese-chartered vessels reached 8.4Mt in 2025. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) estimates that total Chinese LNG resales that year were likely to be between 17Mt and 19Mt, with South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands as the leading destinations.
Fueling this trend is a surge in flexible long-term contracts, particularly from Australia and the United States (US). Growing flexible volumes from Australia have enabled China to optimize its LNG portfolio across the Pacific region, while US supply has largely been leveraged to capitalize on arbitrage opportunities in the Atlantic region. IEEFA estimates that Chinese buyers have profited USD4.6 billion from Australian and US LNG resales since 2021.
China’s surplus is likely to persist and even grow. With LNG contracts expected to reach 114Mt by 2028 and demand constrained by cheaper alternatives, the country is likely to remain overcontracted in the medium term. Several independent demand projections expect an LNG surplus ranging between 11Mt and 48Mt by the early 2030s.
Recent expansion into LNG shipping and bunkering by two state-owned enterprises — the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina), together responsible for most Chinese charterer resales in 2025 — suggests that buyers are looking to market surplus volumes. Both are investing heavily in LNG carrier fleets, expanding bunkering operations at major Chinese ports, and leveraging the Yangpu bonded LNG terminal in Hainan as a transshipment and re-export hub.
China's emergence as a reseller of surplus LNG exposes the fragile assumptions underlying the current wave of LNG export investment. For suppliers, portfolio traders, and aspiring merchant LNG players, the largest LNG demand driver is becoming a competing supplier.
Section 1 of this report examines the evolution of China’s LNG procurement strategy over the last decade. Section 2 uses independent ship-tracking data to identify LNG flows from vessels chartered by Chinese companies and China’s long-term LNG contracts to estimate the country’s LNG resales. Section 3 analyzes this data in greater detail to identify the countries supplying LNG for resale, the markets targeted by resellers, and the estimated profits earned by Chinese charterers from reselling Australian and US LNG. Section 4 examines the uncertainty surrounding China’s LNG demand and uses external projections to plot how the growing LNG surplus will evolve into the early 2030s. Section 5 provides case studies for two of the country’s largest LNG buyers — CNOOC and PetroChina. Lastly, Section 6 discusses the implications of China’s growing role as an LNG trader for other global suppliers and market players.