Philippine power generation surged 9% in 2016, from 82.6 TWh in 2015 to 89.9 TWh, with most of this increase coming from coal-fired plants.
The long-term resilience of the Philippine economy depends on finding a more practical energy model—one that will shield consumers and businesses from price as well as exchange-risk shocks.
As a result of renewable energy cost deflation, the electricity transition taking root in countries around the world is attracting large investors. In 2016, acquisition activity in the renewable energy sector rose by 17% to US$110 billion.
The Philippines has 10,423 megawatts (MW) (US$20.8 billion) of largely imported coal expansion in its current pipeline. This runs on top of a total of 7,419 MW of existing coal-fired capacity. Projections borne of such a pipeline raise vital questions about national energy policy and practices in an era of evolving electricity-generation trends. Stranded coal plant assets—those that are not delivering an economic return in line with the expectations from the project outset—is a growing material and inevitable risk in the Philippines.
In Mindanao, even without retail competition enabled by the presence of a Wholesale Electricity Spot Market, stranding is already taking place due to an oversupply of approximately 700 MW of coal and hydro in an island grid lacking national connectivity.
he surplus of coal fired power has led to a downtrend in utilization rates as compared to original expectations. Conservatively, the underutilization cost in Mindanao alone from 2014 to 2016 is Php 3 billion (US$60 million). This cost is being borne by power producers and ratepayers. The excessive and growing dominance of imported coal in the national generation mix faces challenges by retail competition, the encroachment by imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) into baseload supply, and renewable energy cost deflation. The role of public policy is to ensure that the common citizen—as ratepayers and taxpayers—is shielded from as much risk and cost as possible.
This report seeks to answer whether such concerns are addressed, and whether the ratepayer and/or taxpayer bear a disproportionate amount of risk as compared to financiers, developers, and distribution utilities. It seeks to assess whether the Philippine Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and major distribution utilities like Meralco have taken into adequate consideration the turning point at which LNG and renewable energy become competitive enough to address a significantly rising share of demand growth. It seeks to contribute to the energy discourse, particularly as regards the question of whether banks investing in coal-fired projects are conducting sufficient due diligence, taking into account the above challenges and additional risks that will come with the proper implementation of environmental regulation, including a coal tax and a more robust energy competition policy.
As a vital case study, we look at how Meralco, the country’s largest distribution utility, is now contracting with its subsidiary, Meralco PowerGen Corporation (MGen), to expand its electricity supply to meet forecasted demand growth. Power generation businesses like MGen, as a result, are proposing the construction of over 10,000 MW of coal fired power.
This report details the risks associated with such projects—a list that is long, significant, and cannot be ignored. The Philippines cannot afford to lag behind the rest of the world in acknowledging such risks at a time of accelerating global electricity market transformation.
If capacities at these plants are not fully contracted, this will leave the plants vulnerable to Wholesale Electricity Spot Market prices, which are now at record lows, owing in part to the merit-order effect, which results in zero marginal cost renewables being dispatched ahead of more expensive marginal cost conventional electricity, eroding utilization rates further.
This report also examines the proposed Atimonan Power Station, one of the 3,351 MW 20-year Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) submitted to the ERC for approval before the implementation of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP). These proposals have been described in the press as “midnight deals”. The Atimonan proposal illustrates key aspects of the procurement policy of Meralco; its PSA also shows that Meralco has shown some foresight and is moving in the right direction with an improved “carve-out” provision that should protect ratepayers from inevitable stranded assets, shifting stranded costs to the independent power providers and their investors.
But has the utility in question here, Meralco, examined alternatives that could provide firm capacity to address its forecast load requirements with more natural gas and renewable energy at a time of 10-20% annual electricity cost deflation? LNG and renewable energy generation are already cost-competitive for a rising slice of the overall load. Within the right regulatory framework, renewable energy costs can and should continue to fall, and within a well-defined LNG policy, natural gas can already address all slices of load. Meralco does welcome unsolicited offers from variable renewable energy suppliers, as will be discussed later, but renewable energy possibilities in the Philippines remain largely neglected.
While new thermal capacity is clearly justified in the Philippines, exclusive imported-coal-fired power capacity, for base demand, is far from the full answer. Import coal-fired generation exposes the Philippines needlessly to international coal price risk and currency fluctuation risks.
Greater generation system diversity and domestic generation sourcing will enhance national energy security with renewable energy deflation has very positive consumer benefits. Policymakers should move toward that direction now by adopting open-procurement competition.
Press release: IEEFA: For price-sensitive LNG buyers in Asia, now is not the time to build new LNG import terminals
Please view full report PDF for references and sources.