Projects depending on government financial support transfer risk to taxpayers
Carbon capture and storage projects in Canada still face weak economics and are dependent on government financial support—transferring risk to taxpayers.
The revised carbon-price schedule will lower the potential revenue ceiling for CCS projects.
Government-backed carbon contracts for difference may not guarantee revenue certainty.
The introduction of investment credits and reduced stringency rates may contribute to an already saturated provincial carbon market.
November 19, 2026 (IEEFA)—Despite new carbon capture and storage (CCS) policy measures and additional funding streams, the financial outlook for CCS projects in Alberta remains shaky. The latest report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) updates our past research on the Pathways project and finds that revised carbon-price schedules lower the potential revenue ceiling, and government financial support could pass risk onto taxpayers.
Since the 2025 report, the May 2026 Canada-Alberta implementation agreement and a subsequent Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the federal government, the province of Alberta and the Oil Sands Alliance have been signed. Both agreements include key fiscal and regulatory adjustments, subject to the conclusion of a definitive agreement expected to be announced shortly.
Our report finds that even with these policies in place, measures intended to reduce the financial burden of carbon compliance may weaken revenue conditions needed to make CCS projects viable. Government commitments to regulate the market price for carbon credits could expose taxpayers to escalating financial liabilities.
“Updates to CCS projects in Canada since our last report—including carbon credit price support, investment credits, and operating cost assistance—ultimately reinforce the central concern of our previous research: Large scale CCS deployment remains dependent on external subsidies,” said Mark Kalegha, IEEFA energy finance analyst and author of the report. “The revenue model is fragile and is exposed to material uncertainty due to persistent credit oversupply, insufficient credit demand and long-term operating cost inflation.”
Incentives that reduce demand for credits, expand the number of credit-generating projects or introduce new classes of compliance credits may work against the government’s price-support objectives, increasing the cost of maintaining a price floor. Expanded financial support for CCS project construction and operating expenditures further increases the amount of public capital at risk if projects fail to deliver on their expected performance.
Ultimately, if the government is set on proceeding with CCS deployment, public support should depend on tangible and verifiable outcomes—actual emissions reductions, sustained capture performance, and permanent CO2 storage—rather than simply subsidizing project construction costs or operating deficits. In accordance with the polluter-pays principle, polluters should bear the burden of CCS deployment, retaining benefits if they succeed or absorbing financial losses if they fail.
Canada’s taxpayers should be wary of being made to assume a growing share of project risks without a corresponding guarantee of lasting emission reductions or economic benefits.