and Financial Analysis

The carbon dioxide disposal chain: Elements, goals and risks

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What are the components of the CCS disposal chain?



CCS/CCUS: some common understandings

"U" in CCUS =	"Utilization" is for enhanced oil or gas production in >95% of the cases. Other CO_2 utilization options lack scale.
"Storage" =	CO_2 is forced into pore spaces, not stored in caverns. Goal is to trap or chemically bond CO_2 with rock.
"U" vs "S" =	If you are 'utilizing' CO_2 , you are not storing it. If you are 'storing' CO_2 , you are trying to dispose of it.
How disposed? =	CO_2 is compressed into a "supercritical state", somewhere between liquid and gas, its densest form. This is injected at high pressure (~700atm/10,000psi) a minimum of 800m below the surface.



CCS disposal is not one activity, but a string of separate projects



What are the performance and risks characteristics of the CCS disposal chain?



CO₂ Capture: Real-world data shows carbon capture efficacy rates vary widely, none even close to 90%

Real-World CO₂ Capture

100% carbon capture

95% or higher: Industry claims for CO₂ capture



IEEFA. Blue Hydrogen: not clean, not low carbon, not a solution. September 2023 [updated November 2023].



CO₂ purity requirements for CCS are high

Contaminants change CO₂ properties

- Accelerated corrosion
- Changes liquid-gas point, density

CO_2 needs pre-processing to remove gasses, H_2S , heavy metals

 Filtration byproducts need proper disposal

Emerging risk issue: mixed CO_2 quality CO_2 "hubs" propose to accept a wide range of CO_2 effluents, much like a garbage dump

- These gases must be homogenized
- Increased risk to storage integrity, equipment

	CO ₂ Grade	Purity	Other Gases
	Research	99.999%	<0.001%
Injection Grade	Super-critical fluid	99.998%	<0.002%
Pipeline Grade	Laser	99.95%	<0.05%
	Food & Beverage	99.9%	<0.1%
	Bone Dry	99.8%	<0.2%
	Medical	99.5%	<0.5%
	Industrial	99.5%	<0.5%

Source: adapted from CO2 Meter Gas Measurement Specialists. Carbon Dioxide Purity Grade Chart. February 22, 2024.



CO₂ Pipelines

Only 14,500 km of CO₂ pipelines exist

- 8,000 km of those in the US
- Comparison: 2.4 million km of fossil gas pipelines worldwide, 1.6 m km of which are in the US

Challenging permitting, extensive implementation timeframes

• CO₂ pipelines structurally must be underground

CO₂ pipelines need higher quality/higher cost alloy steels due to corrosion potential

Moisture of only 50ppm can create acids

• Serious pipe corrosion can take place within hours

CO₂ is heavier than air

 Leaks displace oxygen at ground level, high human risk



Denbury CO₂ pipeline rupture, Satartia, Mississippi, February 2020. Source: <u>Huffington Post</u>, April 2021.



CO₂ Shipping

Vessels do not currently exist, must be built

 Design considerations limit carriers to small sizes – e.g. 7,500m³ for Norway's Northern Lights

Higher CO₂ purity needed

• 99.9%, <30ppm water

"Boil-off" of liquid CO₂

• Gasifies at 0.15% per day; ships traveling long distances may require reliquification plants

Design safety considerations

- Specialty materials and designs
- Cannot be used to carry any other commodities

Challenging economics

- Small scale and specialty operating requirements mean high cost per tonne-km.
- Specially designed and configured ports

Cross-border carbon accounting issues





Subsurface CO₂ injections are unlike oil & gas industry equivalents



- CO₂ is injected as a super-critical fluid, its highest density
- Super-critical CO₂ must be ultra-high purity, >99.998%, meaning
 <3ppm water
- Well design is much more stringent when handling CO₂
 - Specialized alloy drill casings, gaskets and high specification cements
- Wellhead fittings and equipment need to be specifically designed and certified to handle CO₂
 - CO₂ fittings must withstand higher temperature and pressure ranges than oil and gas standards
- Much of these fittings and equipment remain in R&D stage
- Maintenance cycles shorter, more critical



CCU is for hydrocarbon production, not CO₂ storage



Subsurface CO₂ storage risks abound and can present at any time



CO₂ behavior won't be known until it is put into the ground, regardless of prior survey, engineering or lab work that goes into site design and preparation

- CO₂ rejected by subsurface geochemistry
- Phase change from supercritical fluid to gas
- Finds undetected faults or subsurface anomalies
- Finds abandoned wells
- Induces corrosion around well casings
- High pressures compromise storage geology
- Induced seismicity affecting surface
- Problems may materialize for many years
- CO₂ underground may not stabilize for decades or centuries, creating high risk, long-term liabilities

Even minor leakage rates undermine the permanent climate premise of CCS. CO₂ storage needs to be more like nuclear waste security with zero loss tolerance.

Q: How do scientists / operators know what is happening to CO₂ in storage?





A: Estimates and models

Only how much CO₂ was injected is known

Operators can only *estimate* how much CO₂ is retained

Verification measurements are made very infrequently

- Can be years in between
- Even then only a snapshot in time
- Large changes/movements can take place



CO₂ volume stored is estimated from data and models ...the models are getting better...



...but only monitoring of CO_2 possible. CO_2 cannot be controlled once in the ground.



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CO₂ storage monitoring, verification, regulation

Regulatory frameworks for storage are nascent

- What to monitor? How to monitor?
- Frequency of measurement? Details of reporting level of confidence?
- Regulator skills and staffing lacking to adequately interpret and intervene.

Operator responsibility period is very short

- In all cases, operator responsibility is far shorter than the physical stabilization period for CO₂
- State assumes all responsibility after the performance period expires,
 - Monitoring, protection, and intervention (if needed)

 and all costs

Contingency Responsibility Period Post CCS Site Closure





CCS disposal chain: cost and risk at every step, CO₂ still emitted



CCS disposal chain is highly challenged



1

Need for integrated disposal chain investment Project on project risk, multiple parties

responsible



Need for new designs and technologies for safety, security Many are still in R&D stage, or untested at commercial scale Disposal sites each are unique and possess great unknowns

3

Not certain how secure storage is, what to do if there are leaks Regulation and oversight are highly technical and long duration

4

CO₂ stabilization periods are likely far longer than operator's responsibility 5

Financial economics are challenged due to lack of clear carbon price

CO₂ is effectively a waste product of little value yet incurs high costs



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Unexpected subsurface geology developments in the two projects call into question the world's offshore CO₂ storage ambitions

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Thank you!

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Support Materials Subsea Storage



Sleipner: 8 CO₂ storage layers quickly become 9

- Original geophysics concept: CO₂ would gradually percolate up through several shaly layers over a period of many years
- Configuration identified through preliminary seismic studies, calculations
- Instead, in less than three years, CO₂ moved all the way to shallowest caprock
- CO₂ accumulated in a previously unidentified layer 9, circa 800m – risk of super-critical CO₂ becoming gaseous
- At some point after 2004, this accumulation grew large and began migrating west towards the UK border
- The horizontal boundaries of Layer 9 remain unknown; no way to stop movement



Source: Statoil ASA. Sleipner – 20 years of successful storage operations and key learning for future projects. IEEFA Skalmeraas. June 29, 2016.

And the shallow plume keeps moving...





Snøhvit: Reduced storage capacity meant finding a new site

Original Plan

- Inject in safe formation underneath gas producing area
- Sufficient capacity for about 18 years of production
- Use time to find suitable follow-on storage space
- Switch over to new area once original layer is full

Original plan 12.6-14Mt + 8.4-10Mt Expected storage capacity Extra capacity needed identified during design to be found Indicative timeline 2018-2020 2008 -2030 2020 2021 Commence Identify Bring extra operations incremental capacity online operations storage capacity What actually happened 12.6-14Mt +8.4Mt 1.4 Extra capacity needed Actual Remedial to be found capacity capacity tapped encountered **Actual timeline** 2011-2015 2008 2011 2016 ~2030 Well New well drilled and backup 2010 intervention storage brought online Limited capacity Additional issue identified storage exploration advanced IEEFA

Remedial Plan

- Use a 'quick fix' layer for • storage to resume operations
- New layer only good for about • 4-6 years of operations, i.e. to ~2016
- Immediately prospect for new • CO₂ storage, starting 2011

End

- Invest in developing new well • and infrastructure, 2016
- Invested additional at least • US\$225 million



CO₂ storage conclusions, cautions

- Geologic variations on every site, thus each will be unique
 - > No one site is a template for the next
 - > The larger the site, the more chances for variations
- Even top-level science and engineering cannot know what will really happen to the storage site or CO₂ in it
- CO₂ underground can only be monitored, not controlled
- CO₂ can stay active for decades or centuries, thus the risk of loss containment remains
- A "minor leak" means CO₂ abatement benefit is lost, and subsidies or credits are for nothing



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Note: "Others" and "Other Fuel Shifts" refer to assorted lower carbon fuel switching, onsite energy provision derived from transformation of primary materials into useable energy, energy derived from wastes/byproducts, alternative fuels.

Source: IEA Net Zero Roadmap. September 2023, IPCC AR-6 Report, March 2023. Left Graphic: E3G adapted from IEA NZR. Right Graphic: IEEFA adapted from IPCC-AR6.



CCS

16.5% by

2050

NetZero