Capacity Market Mischief: Avoiding Unintended Consequences

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THE SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT

Keeping Our Eyes on the Prize – Slashing Power Sector Carbon Emissions

- Dramatically expand renewables.
 - Support technologies and the markets to integrate them successfully into the grid (flexibility critical).
- Prevent coal plants from using markets to extend lives and foreclose cleaner energy options.
 - Capacity market payments
 - Reliability must run payments
- Assure comparable treatment for all resource options in grid planning.
- Energy Efficiency always.

Jurisdiction Matters

- FERC limits clean energy preferences in wholesale power markets and rates.
 - Focused on reliability peak load and reserve margins.
 - Recent decision on ISO-NE forward capacity market rules – overrides state clean energy policy standards; related issues elsewhere.
 - Wellinghoff supports compensation framework to reward DR/DG resources.
- States focused on resource adequacy, state policies (some good, some not so good), costs.

MISO Developments

- Most states in MISO are regulated; they opposed a PJM-like capacity market as unnecessary and costly.
- New Resource Adequacy construct represents a middle ground.
- First planning year starts June 1, 2013; auction is a one year forward auction.
- Utilities can satisfy load obligations with a Fixed Resource Adequacy Plan (FRAP).



MISO Developments

- DR and EE can compete but many state laws prevent aggregators of retail customers from competing in state – significant untapped DSM in MISO (includes fossil fuel backup generation).
- Planning Reserve Margin is based on zone's peak demand – i.e., inflexible.
- Expected clearing price and likely utility behavior for procuring resources?



PJM Capacity Market Concerns and Questions

- Lackluster energy efficiency results to date (922 MW for 2015/16 = 0.5% of cleared resources).
- Significant diesel backup generation for DR mostly in the limited run time product.
- PJM integrating state price responsive demand into energy and capacity markets.
- Has market sustained coal resources and limited new entry?
- External access to PJM market expect Dynegy and select other gen owners to seek more access.

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PJM Emergency DR – New BUG Fuel Data



"Reliability Must Run" Rules/Related Concerns

- Flaws short notification time, compensation includes pollution control equipment upgrade costs, confidentiality rules – *e.g., broad MISO Universal NDA.*
- PJM largely has avoided need for RMRs with significant new transmission projects and excess capacity buffer.
- MISO just beginning to process retirement notifications – *plants also seeking to ride out low gas prices.*



California Capacity Market Discussions

Problems (not everyone agrees on their urgency):

- Reliability issue uncertain whether existing resources will be available beyond 1 year.
- Low energy market prices, inefficient market decisions about retirements.
 - No competition between existing and new generation cheaper existing may retire.
- Need for grid flexibility to account for changing load shape, significantly more renewable energy resources.
- Enormous statewide reserve margin but some ineffective resources in wrong place.



Shifting Load Shape Demands Flexibility



Finding the Right Sweet Spot



Our Preferences

- Reward fast-acting, flexible dispatchable resources to better integrate wind and solar.
 Emphasize regionalism/larger energy markets.
- Assure comparable treatment for demand side resources in markets and planning.
 - Improve RMR rules

- Integrate state and regional grid planning (Order 1000).
- Allow demand side resources in regulated states to access energy and ancillary services markets.
- Capacity markets a costly substitute for resource planning which don't address emerging grid needs.

For Additional Information

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